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Abstract Recent experiments inmoral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning
only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his
moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral
reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present
complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically,
Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often
does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be
biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can
play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments.
Keywords Moral reasoning .Moral dumbfounding .Moral disengagement . Cognitive
dissonance . Reason . Emotion
Folk wisdom has it that you should think before you act. The underlying idea is that people
often come to regret acting on impulse. The folk wisdom seems to be inspired at least in part
by moral concerns. People might end up doing the wrong thing when they act in a rash
manner. On a pre-reflective or common sense picture of morality, then, it is a good idea to
consider moral matters explicitly and think about them carefully. This picture, however, has
come under substantial pressure. A lot of research in psychology suggests that conscious
reasoning as such is of limited use and merely serves to confirm beliefs we already have
(Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Nickerson 1998; Wilson 2002; Johansson et al. 2005).
Jonathan Haidt (2001, 2012) has developed this argument for the case of moral thought. He
maintains that, typically, moral reasoning merely serves to confirm prior intuitions and is in
this sense biased. As people are not interested in changing their opinions, they hardly ever
change their moral views. This means that individual moral reasoning is also ineffective.
Haidt’s experiments suggest that people simply reaffirm their pre-reflective moral intuitions
when they run out of arguments – that is, in Haidt’s terms, when they are ‘morally
dumbfounded’. This holds for almost all of us for almost all of the time (Haidt mentions
philosophers as an exception, as they form ‘one of the few groups that has been found to
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reason well’; 2001: 819). In light of this, I argue in section 2 that the thrust of Haidt’s
dumbfounding research is this: when it comes to moral matters, reason is powerless, and
intuition carries the day.
I argue, against Haidt, that objective and effective moral reasoning lies within reach of lots
of people and need not be a rare exception. As Monin, Pizarro, and Beer (2007) point out,
Haidt’s claim to the contrary is based on a rather limited range of empirical research. In order
to show that other research supports a more optimistic view, I contrast Haidt’s research
concerning moral dumbfounding with Bandura (1999; Bandura et al. 1996) research on what
he calls ‘moral disengagement’. Moral disengagement occurs when someone suspects a
conflict between an envisaged action and prior intuitions. Such a conflict gives rise to
cognitive dissonance, which is resolved by means of rationalization that facilitates preferred
behavior. As such, moral reasoning is self-serving. Bandura’s research suggests that moral
rationalizations often are effective in altering the beliefs people form. As cognitive dissonance
involves cognition as well as affect, Bandura’s disengagement research can be used to illustrate
what Monin, Pizarro, and Beer call ‘the interplay between emotion and reason’ (2007: 102).
Whereas Haidt is exclusively concerned with post hoc rationalization, Bandura’s disengage-
ment research concerns rationalization that occurs prior to an action, or ‘anticipatory rational-
ization’. Moral disengagement typically causes people to flout their moral principles. As I
argue in section 3, however, moral reasoning sometimes serves the role of a disinterested
judge. Before discussing disengagement (section 3) and dumbfounding (section 2) in more
detail, I explain what I mean by moral reasoning (section 1).
1 Moral Reasoning
Imagine you are driving on the highway and you notice that you are speeding. You realize that
you violate the traffic rules and perhaps you recognize that you thereby increase the risk of
getting into an accident. At the same time, however, you notice that other people are also
speeding. On the basis of this second consideration you conclude that it is ok to drive as fast as
you do. In this scenario you engage in moral reasoning. You consider an issue that is morally
relevant – whether it is ok to speed given that you thereby increase the risk of harm to which
you expose other people. And you bring to bear an observation on this matter – that other
people do the same. You use this observation to formulate an argument – it is ok to speed
because other people do so as well – and you form a moral judgment – that it is ok to speed.
Without having the ambition to define exactly what it is, let me characterize the notion of
moral reasoning in a way that fixes the phenomenon in sufficient detail for the purposes of this
paper (cf. Richardson 2013). An agent engages in moral reasoning when she assesses moral
considerations in order to arrive at a conclusion as to what some agent is permitted,
prohibited, or obliged to do.1 As the agent that is evaluated need not be the agent that is
doing the evaluating, moral reasoning can be other-directed or self-directed. Arriving at a
conclusion is a matter of forming or reaffirming a judgment. Whereas this characterization
fixes the proximate goal of moral reasoning – to evaluate the propriety of actions – it leaves
open whether the ultimate aim is, for instance, to persuade people of a possibly prior
conclusion (Mercier and Sperber 2011 argue that this is the point of reasoning as such).
Persuasion can also be other-directed or self-directed. In the speeding example, you engage in
1 As this is only a sufficient condition, it is, for instance, consistent with reasoning concerning values being moral
reasoning as well.
238 F. Hindriks
self-directed reasoning in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether it is ok for you to speed
there and then. And presumably your aim is to persuade yourself that it is.
People sometimes engage in motivated reasoning, which is driven by a preference that the
agent has for a particular conclusion.2 If the prior judgment you seek to affirm is in your own
interest, as it probably is in the speeding example, you engage in self-serving reasoning. In this
paper, I follow common practice within psychology and equate rationalization with motivated
reasoning.3 On this usage of the term, your speeding self engages in rationalization, whereas
the self that slowed down did not. In terms of the legal metaphor that Haidt uses: the self that
slows down reasons as a judge, whereas the speeding self reasons as a lawyer.4
Having commented on the goals that moral reasoning can have, I now turn to its content,
and ask what the moral considerations are that are assessed in moral reasoning. Moral
considerations can be moral principles – such as the principles of non-maleficence and
beneficence – or values – such as fairness, autonomy, or friendship. They can also be moral
reasons more narrowly conceived, such as particular harm or benefit, or particular disrespect-
ful behaviors. As the speeding example reveals, the content of moral reasoning can also feature
apparent reasons, such as the observation that everybody else is speeding. For all I know, and
as I will suppose, this is not a legitimate consideration. Instead, it is something that you
merely take to be a reason. Your reasoning contributes to your judgment in the sense that your
judgment depends on it: you could have arrived at another moral judgment had you taken
different arguments into account or if you weighted the ones you did consider differently.
In addition to content, there are external influences that bear on the conclusions someone
draws.5 You might, for instance, suddenly remember that you will be home alone tonight and that
there is little reason to be home early today. Or you might notice that someone put some flowers
on the side of the road, which makes the risk of harming others more vivid in your mind. Perhaps
you start feeling like a hypocrite, as you always tell your children to drive safely. The fact that
something pops up in your memory, that something is particularly vivid in your mind, or that you
feel guilty because of your hypocrisy are factors that do not as such feature in your reasoning.
They do, however, influence the conclusion you reach. They do so by influencing the cognitive
salience of a consideration, and by influencing the weight that you attach to it.
External factors such as these play an important role in Jesse Prinz’s conception of moral
reasoning. He takes it to boil down to an emotional struggle: ‘[W]e deliberate about moral
dilemmas by pitting emotions against emotions. Conflicting rules have different emotional
strength, and the stronger emotions win out.’ (Prinz 2007: 25) Even though moral rules or
principles feature in its content, the outcome of the reasoning process is determined by the
strength of the emotions that support them. The same holds for reasoning concerning values,
which are ‘rock bottom’ or ‘thin’ reasons that hardly leave any room for reasoning (2007: 31
and 125). Emotions determine which conclusion the agent draws.
Emotions play a central role in cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when
some cognitive discrepancy, such as a perceived inconsistency between two beliefs, leads to
psychological discomfort, for instance in the guise of guilt feelings. This discomfort motivates
2 Ditto, Pizarro and Tannenbaum define motivated moral reasoning as reasoning ‘in which an individual has an
affective stake in perceiving a given act or person as either moral or immoral, and this preference alters reasoning
processes in a way that adjusts moral assessments in line with the desired conclusion.’ (2009: 312)
3 Philosophers typically say that an agent rationalizes a belief, intention, or action when she provides reasons for
it that play a causal role in the formation of the attitude or the performance of the action (Davidson 1963). What
motivates the agent in doing so is irrelevant to whether providing reasons counts as rationalizing.
4 See Haidt (2001, 2012) and Ditto et al. 2009: 309–12) for similar uses of the lawyer-judge metaphor.
5 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to distinguish clearly between content and goals of moral
reasoning, as well as factors that influence it.
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the agent to reason and find a way to resolve the cognitive discrepancy.6 In section 3.1, I
discuss the role that cognitive dissonance plays in moral disengagement. More specifically,
there I explain how people use reasoning to get themselves to believe that an envisaged action
that apparently conflict with their moral principles does not do so after all.
How does the concept of moral reasoning relate to the dominant theoretical framework with
which psychologists work nowadays: Dual System Theory? Dual Systems Theory postulates two
systems of mental processing (Evans 2008; Kahneman 2011). System 1 is automatic, uncon-
scious, and quick, process 2 is controlled, conscious, and slow. Although System 1 usually
processes affect and System 2 is dedicated primarily to reasoning processes, the distinction
between these two systems does not match perfectly on to that between emotion and reasoning.
Emotions can be conscious, and not all cognitive processes require consciousness. The argument I
go on to present can be developed in terms of both distinctions. Here I prefer to develop the
argument in terms of emotion versus reasoning.7 This facilitates connecting my conclusions to the
debate about sentimentalism versus rationalism. Note also that some moral psychologists use this
terminology as well. Asmentioned in the introduction,Monin et al. (2007) talk about the interplay
of emotion and reasoning. In sections 3 I set out to make precise how affect and cognition can
interact, and what role cognitive dissonance plays in the process.
2 Moral Dumbfounding
Haidt’s (2001; Haidt et al. 2000) experiments about moral reasoning focus on harmless taboo
violations performed by unknown others. Examples include consensual sibling sex, cleaning a
toilet with the national flag, and eating the pet dog that just died in a car accident. Haidt
discovered that, when he asks people to defend the negative verdicts they tend to form, people
quickly run out of arguments. A number of those who are morally dumbfounded in this manner
refer to emotions as their point of last resort. They simply say: ‘It’s just disgusting.’ And this is
supposed to be the end of the matter.
The conclusion Haidt draws from these experiments is that reasoning does not play a
significant role in the formation of moral judgments. He claims that many of the arguments
people give are post-hoc rationalizations – biased arguments provided after the judgment has
been formed – or confabulations – invented arguments that did not play a role in causing the
judgment and hence cannot have justified it. Such arguments serve to confirm prior moral
intuitions that are due to unconscious, automatic and often affective processes. This implies that
moral reasoning does not function as an objective and disinterested judge, but as a prejudiced
lawyer whose goal it is to make prior intuitions look good. The bottom line of this research is
supposed to be that, for the most part, reason is powerless, and intuition carries the day.8
My main criticism of Haidt’s view will be that the dumbfounding findings provide an
incomplete picture of moral reasoning. The dumbfounding experiments have, however, also
been criticized for suffering from internal problems.9 Consider, for instance, Haidt’s
6 Churchland (2011) provides useful ideas for developing this account of moral reasoning further. She argues, for
instance, that understanding a moral rule is best understood in terms of skills such as cue-based reasoning that
involve the use of ‘case-based analogies, emotions, memory, and imagination’ (2011: 171, 183–84).
7 In Hindriks (2014) I focus on the role intuitions play in the formation of moral judgment and present what I call
‘Sentimental Rationalism’ as an alternative to the views of Haidt, Nichols, and Prinz.
8 Haidt (2012) compares our ‘affective receptors’ to taste buds. The affective responses they give rise to can be
full-blown emotions, which Haidt takes to be cognitive appraisals (2001, 2012).
9 For more internal criticisms, see Churchland (2012), Fine (2006), Paxton, Ungar, and Greene (2010), Pizarro
and Bloom (2003), Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004), Sauer (2011), and Sneddon (2007).
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assumption that the fact that the taboo violations are harmless implies that the scenarios that
feature them form an exception to a moral prohibition. This can reasonably be denied, as many
deontologists and rule consequentialists will do. They take morality to consist in rules that do
not have exceptions. In light of this, they could, for instance, reject Haidt’s presumption that
sibling sex is permitted when it involves no harm. This criticism is particularly apt in the case
of participants who, rather than appealing to an emotion, invoke a norm when they run out of
(other) arguments. For all we know, this is exactly the thing to do, which means that the
reasoning that dumbfounded people engage in need not be biased.
These considerations derive support from research conducted by Kohlberg and by Neo-
Kohlbergians, the tradition that Haidt vehemently opposes. Kohlberg distinguishes three levels
of moral development: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. In the (advanced
stage of the) conventional level, people focus on maintaining social order. Neo-Kohlbergians
argue that people rely in this stage on the Maintaining Norms Schema. In light of this schema,
the commonly provided response Bbecause you’re not supposed to do that^ may well be a
perfectly legitimate response (Rest et al. 2000; cf. Prinz 2007: 34–35). The response ceases to
be valid for those who reach the postconventional level. Perhaps the minority of the partici-
pants in the dumbfounding experiments that does change its mind have progressed to this
level. They respond rationally in a way that fits their more advanced level of moral develop-
ment.10 Incidentally, Neo-Kohlbergians take cognitive dissonance to play an important role in
explaining how people move from one stage of moral development to another (Rest et al.
2000). As I discuss in section 3.1, cognitive dissonance tends to generate self-justifying
reasoning. This suggests that the Neo-Kohlbergians can also explain why people feel pressed
to provide arguments in order to defend the moral judgments they form. The main conclusion
to draw at this point is that the pessimistic conclusions Haidt draws from the dumbfounding
findings do not follow. Rather than moral reasoning being biased and ineffective, it may just as
well be that the different responses fit different stages of development.
In the remainder of this paper, I develop a line of criticism that is external to the
dumbfounding experiments as such. I argue that the evidence that Haidt considers is too
one-sided to warrant the general conclusions that he draws about moral reasoning. The
argument below is inspired by Monin, Pizarro, and Beer who observe that the dumbfounding
experiments concern only reasoning that is directed at others and maintain that in such
situations ‘emotions are primary when judging the shocking infractions of others’ (ibid.:
104). They also argue, however, that ‘[r]easoning is primary when [people are] confronted
with first-person dilemmas’ (ibid.). Furthermore, they suggest that research into moral temp-
tation and moral self-image will ‘reflect a greater interplay between cognition and emotion’
(ibid.: 105). I follow their lead by considering empirical studies about moral disengagement
that concern the agent’s own actions reasoning. A striking feature of these studies is that, rather
than post hoc rationalization they concern anticipatory rationalization. These studies enable us
to see that both affect and cognition can play destructive as well as constructive roles in moral
reasoning.
Before turning to moral disengagement, I should mention a methodological problem that
this kind of research faces. Haidt needs some criterion for characterizing certain forms of
reasoning as bad. The problem is that none of us has special access either to which moral
judgments are correct, or to the epistemic standing of particular lines of moral reasoning. Haidt
10 In Hindriks (2014) I develop the more basic idea that the minority might be right. In terms of what I call ‘the
dominant minority argument’, I argue that their reasoning reveals what role justification is supposed to play in
relation to moral judgment. This remains true if the majority reasons in a way that is appropriate to their (lower)
level of moral development.
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solves this problem by using an indicator of bad moral reasoning or irrationality. Reasoning
does not function well or is ineffective when an agent who has no arguments left to support her
intuition does not change her judgment. As is implied by the preceding discussion, however,
this is at best an imperfect indicator. Sometimes it is perfectly rational not to revise your views
even if you are not aware of a good argument in favor of it (other than that the action violates a
particular taboo). In what follows I rely on a closely related indicator of ineffective reasoning:
not changing your judgment in the light of arguments against it. Just as the one Haidt uses, this
indicator is imperfect. There is, however, no reason to think that it functions worse than Haidt’s
indicator. After all, it does not bode well for the quality of the agent’s reasoning when she
ignores counterarguments. Using this indicator, I argue that moral disengagement research
reveals that moral reasoning is often causally effective and sometimes even disinterested.
3 Moral Disengagement
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people are questioned about the judgments they form about
other people. Rather than with other-directed judgments, moral disengagement is concerned
with self-directed judgments. Moral disengagement is triggered when someone suspects that
the action she wants to perform is inconsistent with her moral standards. The negative affect
that this thought causes motivates her to reason her way to the conclusion that the conflict was
only apparent, as this will resolve the negative affect. Moral Disengagement Theory (MDT) is
intimately related to cognitive dissonance theory. Appreciating the relation between them will
help to understand MDT. It will also serve to appreciate a role that rationalization can play
other than reaffirming prior judgments, that of facilitating immoral behavior. Once I have
discussed cognitive dissonance and its relation to moral disengagement (sections 3.1 and 3.2),
I go on to argue that moral disengagement research reveals that moral reasoning can in fact be
effective – by resolving cognitive conflicts (section 3.3) – and unbiased – when the desire to
perform the incongruent action is outweighed by other factors (section 3.4).
3.1 Cognitive Dissonance Theory
The core claim of Leon Festinger’s (1957) Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT) is that a
discrepancy between two cognitions causes the agent to experience psychological discomfort,
which he seeks to reduce by changing one or more of his cognitions. Two cognitions are
dissonant with each other when one of them entails the negation of the other. Such a cognitive
discrepancy gives rise to psychological discomfort in the form of negative affect. Whereas
Festinger used the term ‘cognitive dissonance’ both for the discrepancy and the psychological
discomfort it causes, I follow Eddie Harmon-Jones (2000: 121, 136–37) and use it only for the
discomfort. Festinger distinguishes three ways in which dissonance can be reduced: forming
new consonant beliefs, reducing the number of dissonant beliefs, and increasing the impor-
tance of consonant beliefs. The agent can achieve this, for instance, by misperceiving,
misinterpreting, or rejecting information she receives (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999a).
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) found evidence for CDT by considering the consequences
of paying someone for telling others that a boring task was interesting. If belief were a matter
of incentives and reinforcement, paying someone more would increase the degree to which the
agent would in fact come to believe that the task he promotes is in fact interesting. CDT
predicts the opposite. A substantial amount of money provides sufficient justification for
someone to promote the task. When he receives a low amount, the agent experiences
substantial cognitive dissonance and has to justify to himself the fact that he pretends that
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the task was interesting. He does this by changing his cognitions and coming to believe that the
task was more interesting than he believed previously. Doing so involves reasoning that is
motivated by the desire to relieve the psychological discomfort, which implies that reasoning
triggered by cognitive dissonance is motivated reasoning.
Although (Mills 1999: 32) observes that he mentions anticipatory rationalization at some
point, Festinger proceeded on the assumption that motivated reasoning always takes plays after
the agent performed the act that creates the discrepancy. The evidence reveals, however, that
biased reasoning also occurs prior to acting. Furthermore, such anticipatory rationalizations
can facilitate behavior such as continuing to play a card game against professional gamblers
while loosing money (Mills 1999: 36). Anticipatory rationalizations that facilitate behavior are
central to moral disengagement.
Now why do cognitive discrepancies lead to cognitive dissonance? Elliot Aronson (1999)
explains this in terms of the fact that people want to have a consistent and positive self-
concept. Dissonance reduction enables the agent to maintain her self-concept by means of self-
justification. In the example just discussed, an agent who lies about how interesting a task was
will feel guilty. In order for him to restore the self-concept and continue to regard himself as a
moral person, this guilt has to be resolved by means of rationalization (Aronson 1999: 111–
12). Morality tends to be a significant dimension of the self-concept. The idea that people
desire to maintain self-consistency also plays a central role in Bandura’s MDT.
3.2 Moral Disengagement Theory
Moral disengagement theory is embedded in Bandura’s social cognitive theory of self-
regulation (1986, 1989, 2001). Social cognitive theory concerns the role that beliefs about
the self play in generating actions. Self-beliefs such as self-efficacy beliefs feature in self-
regulatory processes that link thought to action. Self-regulation involves a process of proactive
guidance as well as a process of reactive adjustment, two processes that people need to
balance. The standards by which people guide themselves include not only personal standards
but also moral standards.
According to social cognitive theory, moral standards can be more or less central to
someone’s self-conception. And whether a standard impacts on someone’s action depends
on whether it is accessed at the relevant moment. This in turn depends both on the agent and on
her environment: both on how central the standard is to her self-understanding and on whether
environmental features make the standard accessible. When it is accessible the desire to
maintain self-consistency may be frustrated due to an action that the agent wants to perform,
as the action might conflict with the agent’s moral standards. This results in psychological
discomfort in the form of anticipatory guilt feelings. Although Bandura rarely if ever uses the
term in writing, these feelings constitute cognitive dissonance.11
Moral disengagement occurs in situations in which someone is tempted to flout his own
moral standards, and thereby to frustrate his desire to maintain self-consistency. Due to a real
or imagined cognitive conflict between the envisaged action and the standard, this person
experiences guilt feelings before even performing the action. The guilt feelings form a kind of
anticipatory self-sanctioning, which makes the agent more aware of the perceived conflict. As
discussed towards the end of section 3.1, such anticipatory guilt feelings constitute cognitive
11 Aquino et al. (2005: 386) recognize that moral disengagement is a matter of reducing cognitive dissonance by
means of rationalizations. Moore (2008) does not and maintains instead that disengagement pre-empts cognitive
dissonance. This may well be due to a failure to acknowledge the possibility of anticipatory guilt feelings and
anticipatory rationalizations.
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dissonance. Cognitive dissonance, in turn, tends to trigger processes of moral reasoning that
are aimed at resolving the conflict. Moral disengagement occurs at this point when, rather than
enlisting them, people selectively disengage moral standards (Bandura 2001: 9). Moral
disengagement, then, consists of anticipatory rationalization that serves to facilitate action that
is apparently in conflict with the agent’s moral standards. Rather than post hoc rationalization,
such anticipatory reasoning is a matter of what I call ‘ante hoc rationalization’. Note that moral
disengagement can also take place when the agent has already started performing the relevant
action, as in the speeding example. As it is aimed at getting rid of unpleasant guilt feelings, the
reasoning or rationalization that the agent engages in is not only motivated reasoning, but also
self-serving.
Having explained what it is, I now turn to the argumentative strategies that people rely on
when morally disengaging, as well as to the empirical evidence that support people employ
those strategies. Recall the argument presented in favor of speeding in section 1: everybody
does it. This is an instance of what Bandura calls ‘responsibility diffusion’. This strategy
enables you arrive at a cognitive re-construal of the situation on which speeding does not
appear very wrong and seems hardly blameworthy if at all. Bandura distinguishes seven other
‘disengagement mechanisms’, which are reasoning strategies aimed at undermining the
thought that there is a genuine conflict between what you want to do and what your moral
standards permit you to do. These reasoning strategies include well-known strategies such as
blaming the victim (‘she should not have worn such a revealing dress’) and dehumanization
(‘they are filthy like dogs’). These mechanisms provide people with bad arguments, which
give rise to the belief that some ostensible conflict with the moral principles to which they
subscribe is illusory. In this way, her rationalizations provide apparent justification for
performing the action, which serves to avoid self-condemnation and disengage the process
of self-sanctioning.12
In one of the most elaborate empirical studies performed on this topic, Bandura et al. (1996)
find that moral disengagement decreases helpfulness and cooperativeness and increases
aggression and delinquency in children.13 Bandura et al. (1996) studied 124 children most
of whom were in their final year of elementary school or in the first few years of junior high
school. Parents, peers, and teachers, as well as the children themselves contributed to the
collection of data. At the beginning of the study, the children rated their acceptance of moral
exonerations concerning, for instance, physical and verbal abuse, deception and theft. These
ratings were used to measure moral disengagement. As it turned out, the children employed a
wide range of disengagement mechanisms including in particular distorting the consequences
(they construe injurious behavior as serving righteous purposes), displacement of responsibil-
ity (they disown responsibility for harmful effects), and dehumanization (they devalue those
who are maltreated).
Questionnaires filled in by parents and teachers in combination with peer ratings were
subsequently used to obtain data concerning prosocial and antisocial behavior. One of the
findings is that moral disengagement fosters proneness to aggression, which in turn promotes
delinquent behavior. What makes this study of particular interest for the purposes of this paper,
however, is that it includes measures of affect and cognition: a hostile rumination measure and
an irascibility measure, as well as a guilt and restitution measure. These measures provide for a
12 Four of the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement that Bandura 1999, Bandura et al. 1996) distinguishes
pertain to conduct and its consequences: moral justification, advantageous comparison, euphemistic labeling, and
disregarding or distorting the consequences. Both displacement and diffusion of responsibility pertain to the
agent. Dehumanization, and attribution of blame pertain to the victim.
13 See Gini et al. (2014) for a meta-analysis that finds that moral disengagement significantly correlates with
aggressive behavior among children and adolescents.
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unique perspective on moral disengagement, as they facilitated testing the relation between
moral disengagement and guilt feelings. In a structural equation model that Bandura et al.
(1996) estimated, they found that moral disengagement decreases anticipatory guilt over
transgressions. This confirms the role of cognitive dissonance in moral disengagement.
A study concerning prison personnel from maximum-security penitentiaries provides more
evidence concerning the role of cognitive dissonance (Osofsky, Bandura, and Zimbardo 2005).
In all likelihood executioners agree that prisoners on death row deserve the death penalty. One
might think that they do not need to employ disengagement mechanisms in order to do their
job. Nevertheless, they do employ a number of disengagement mechanisms including euphe-
mistic labeling, advantageous comparison, and displacement of responsibility (ibid.: 379). As
it turns out, actually killing someone requires disengagement even in the absence of a strict
inconsistency with agential moral standards. Apparently, it is not easy to eradicate ethical
qualms about killing even when the agent recognizes the case as an exception. This study
includes experiential reports, which reveal that the executioners experience affective resistance
to killing and rely heavily on emotion regulation to do their job (ibid.: 389). In the semi-
structured interviews that were conducted, the executioners report managing their thought
processes in order to enable themselves to go through with the killing.14
Empirical studies of moral disengagement that include measures of behavior are in
fact rare. Most studies relate moral disengagement to attitudes such as support for war
and terrorism (McAlister 2001). The studies that do concern behavior provide support
for the idea that moral disengagement facilitates behaviors such as cheating, lying,
and stealing (Detert et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2012). Detert et al. (2008) find that
moral disengagement has predictive power over individual differences such as empa-
thy and trait cynicism. Furthermore, the effect of individual differences is mediated by
moral disengagement. Moore et al. go as far as claiming that the adult measure for
moral disengagement they construct ‘is the strongest individual difference predictor of
unethical behavior to date’, this in comparison to rivals such as Macchiavellianism,
cognitive moral development, and empathy (2012: 40).
So how does disengagement relate to dumbfounding? There are some striking differences
between the two. Whereas dumbfounding concerns other-directed post hoc reasoning, disen-
gagement is a matter of self-directed ante hoc reasoning. Furthermore, the former is aimed at
reaffirming pre-existing intuitions, whereas the latter is aimed at facilitating behavior that is at
least apparently inconsistent with the agent’s intuitions. Such inconsistencies are brought to
light by anticipatory guilt feelings.
In spite of these differences, however, the post hoc rationalizations involved in
dumbfounding may well be motivated by the same desire as disengagement – the desire to
maintain a consistent self-concept as a rational and moral agent. After all, participants in the
dumbfounding experiments are highly motivated to try and justify their point of view, as is
suggested by the fact that they even invented victims in scenarios in which no one was actually
harmed. In light of this, it may well be that at least some of the participants who are left without
an argument experience cognitive dissonance. What remains to be done is see whether, in light
of these similarities and differences, Haidt’s claims about moral reasoning being ineffective
and biased generalize to moral disengagement.
14 Osofsky et al. describe this part of the interviews as follows: ‘Also discussed was their emotional reactions in
preparation, during, and after an execution, the extent to which they discuss their experiences with others, their
perception of the stressfulness of the process, and the ways they tried to manage their stress in this situation. The
interviews ranged from 30 min to 2 h with an average interview time of 1 h.’ (2005: 381)
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3.3 The Effectiveness of Moral Disengagement
Haidt claims that (private) moral rationalizations typically reaffirm prior judgments and is as
such ineffective. Is moral disengagement effective in changing people’s attitudes? The evi-
dence suggests that cognitive dissonance in general and moral disengagement in particular
does indeed cause genuine changes in beliefs. Moral disengagement generates beliefs by
mechanisms that facilitate judgments and behaviors that conflict with the agent’s moral
standards. To be sure, it is not effective in the sense of overturning existing beliefs.
Disengagement is triggered by the suspicion that there might be a conflict. This suspicion is
replaced by the belief that there is no such conflict. Thus, disengagement prevents the agent
from forming the belief that there is a genuine conflict between the action that she wants to
perform and the moral standards to which she subscribes. In this sense, moral disengagement
is effective in generating a belief.
Haidt argues that moral reasoning does little else than confirm prior intuitions. How do
moral intuitions feature in moral disengagement? For one thing, moral standards can be seen as
general moral intuitions when conceptualized as affect-backed rules (Nichols 2004). And the
affect infused in those standards might give rise to the specific intuitions Haidt is concerned
with. Those moral standards contribute to the thought that a particular action that the agent
wants to perform is in conflict with them. This perceived cognitive discrepancy gives rise to
cognitive dissonance or an anticipatory guilt feeling. This can be seen as an intuition that it
might be wrong to perform the action under consideration. Moral disengagement overrules this
intuition. In this sense, and in contrast to what Haidt claims, moral reasoning is effective. The
upshot is that, pace Haidt, intuition does not always carry the day. Reasoning can be powerful
enough to overturn it.
The extent to which this is reason for celebration is limited, however. Just as reasoning prior
to dumbfounding, reasoning leading up to disengagement is motivated reasoning. Moreover,
and in contrast to dumbfounding, disengagement is tailored to facilitate immoral behavior
(supposing the agent’s moral standards are adequate to begin with). And even if the standards
are questionable, disengagement mechanisms such as blaming the victim and dehumanization
are likely to result in immoral behavior.15 Hence, even though moral reasoning is often
effective, it tends to make the quality of moral judgments worse. As it will often lead to
immoral actions, moral disengagement can in this sense be destructive. In the legal terms used
by Haidt, the empirical findings discussed suggest that reason functions as a lawyer that seeks
to overturn an intuition, even when intuition should prevail.
3.4 The Moral High Road: Unbiased Reasoning
Thus far, I have argued that moral reasoning can be effective in overturning an intuition and
contributing to a judgment that the agent would not have formed in the absence of moral
disengagement. What remains for me to argue is that moral reasoning leading up to action need
not be biased. The underlying idea is that some people resist at least some of the time the
temptation to employ one or more moral disengagement mechanisms. Rather than taking the
low road of disengagement, they take the high road in that they take their guilt feelings
15 The effects of the rationalization can be temporary. The pressure to rationalize can, for instance, recede when
one has performed the act. In that case, the agent may come to see that she was blinded to the discrepancy. As Till
Vierkant pointed out to me, however, it may also be that someone’s rationalizations reveal his real moral
commitments. It might be, for instance, that someone thinks he opposes speeding, but discovers during a process
of rationalization that he in fact regards speeding as unproblematic. Perhaps he tells himself that the increase in
risk is negligible, and comes to the conclusion that this in fact what he genuinely believes.
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seriously. If they conclude that those feelings point them in the right direction, they will refrain
from performing the action they initially wanted to perform. Thus, their reasoning is not
susceptible to the bias involved in reasoning involved in moral disengagement.
In order to determine whether there is evidence for such unbiased reasoning, we need to
know which factors influence the extent to which people disengage. Celia Moore (2008)
discusses this in terms of what she calls ‘the propensity to morally disengage’. As it turns out,
women have a lower propensity to disengage than men (Bandura et al. 1996; McAlister 2001;
Detert et al. 2008). The same holds for younger people in comparison to older ones (Osofsky,
Bandura, and Zimbardo 2005).16 Furthermore, an individual trait such as cynicism correlates
with a high propensity, whereas empathy and moral identity correlate with a low propensity
(Moore 2008). In addition to this, awareness and discussion tend to decrease the extent to
which people morally disengage (ibid.). Uhlmann et al. (2009) note in this connection that the
extent to which people engage in motivated reasoning is limited: people only do so when it
does not pose a threat to their self-image ‘as fair and objective judges’ (ibid.: 314).17
Recall that, according to Bandura, how central the moral standards are to the agent’s self-
conception bears on moral disengagement. This idea is developed further inMoral Identity Theory
(MIT). Karl Aquino defines moral identity in terms of someone’s moral commitments, including
commitments to values, goals, traits and behavioral scripts (Aquino et al. 2009: 124, see also
Aquino and Reed 2002). Someone with a strong moral identity regards it as more important than
other self-concepts, including for instance her private, public and collective self-concept. People
are, the thought is, more inclined to stick to their moral standards when their moral identity plays a
central role in their thinking. In this way, someone’s moral identity can strengthen her motivation to
stick to her moral standards and act accordingly.Moral identity facilitates action in accordancewith
the agent’s moral standards in particular when it is activated, conscious, or accessible.
How exactly does someone’s moral identity bear on moral reasoning? It can have an effect
on someone’s moral judgment without her experiencing cognitive dissonance. Someone with a
strong identity will usually be conscious of her moral commitments and will hardly be tempted
to act in a way that conflict with them. In such cases, those commitments can feature in the
content of her reasoning. Furthermore, they will carry a lot of weight. Someone with a weaker
identity who has less access to her moral commitments might be influenced by it uncon-
sciously. As discussed in section 1, they will then function as external factors and influence
reasoning as such. Such a person will be more prone to temptation and thereby more likely to
experience cognitive dissonance. Note that this leaves open the possibility that he ends up
honoring her commitments. After all, someone’s moral identity might be weak enough to open
the door for temptation, but strong enough to resist it. In such a case, moral identity helps to
curb the temptation to violate internalized moral standards. The upshot is that, at least in
theory, conscious moral thought strengthens moral motivation and is good for moral or at least
self-consistent action.
So what does moral identity do when it influences thinking and decision-making? Aquino
and Reed (2003) find that, in comparison to people with a weak moral identity, people with a
strong moral identity are nicer to outsiders, i.e., to people who do not belong to their group.
Such people are inclined to define the in-group in more expansive terms and report stronger
16 Osofsky et al. (2005) also mention education and ethnicity as factors that correlate with moral disengagement.
According to them, the less educated and Caucasians morally engage more than their contrast classes.
17 Uhlmann et al. (2009) present evidence that people sometimes use moral principles selectively in order to
support and rationalize their preferred conclusions. They also find, however, that people do not switch between
principles across situations when a within-subject design is used. They conclude that the affective stakes must be
high for motivated reasoning to occur when its low quality is particularly salient.
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moral obligations towards out-group members. Furthermore, they are more favorable regard-
ing relief efforts to assist them, and less accepting towards harming innocent out-group
members in the course of military retaliation. Finally, they tend to donate to an out-group
rather than an in-group member when presented with this choice. Thus, moral identity
mitigates in-group favoritism and out-group hostility.
Aquino et al. (2005), Devert et al. (2008), and Moore et al. (2012) explore the connection
between moral identity and moral disengagement. They find a negative correlation between
them, which means that those with a strong moral identity are less prone to moral disengage-
ment. The upshot is that, when an agent is aware of her moral identity, this strengthens moral
motivation and is conducive to action that is self-consistent.18
These empirical findings strongly suggest that moral identity contributes to the quality of
the moral judgment someone forms. Having an accessible moral identity helps people to stick
to their moral standards. It serves to avoid rationalization aimed at obscuring conflicts between
envisaged actions on the one hand and moral commitments on the other. Furthermore, they
treat such conflicts as a sufficient reason for not performing the action. Moral identity research
thereby reveals that the way in which someone arrives at a decision to perform an action need
not be biased. Given adequate moral standards, moral identity can function in a constructive
manner so as to support morally appropriate action. Someone with a relatively strong moral
identity is likely to be conscious of her moral standards when they bear on an action that the
agent wants to perform. To the extent that such a person engages in reasoning it will be
unbiased in the sense that he objectively checks whether an action conflicts with self-imposed
moral standards. The agent’s reasoning functions as a disinterested judge. Thus, MIT supports
the conclusion that reason can be powerful even if intuition carries the day.
3.5 The Cognitive Dissonance Model of Moral Reasoning
These findings concerning moral disengagement and moral identity can be used to add further
detail to the Cognitive Dissonance Model of moral reasoning that I have introduced elsewhere
(Hindriks 2014). The point of departure of this model is the assumption that people have a
moral self-concept that encompasses the moral standards to which they subscribe (stage 0).
Against this background, an agent might contemplate performing an action that might be
prohibited by one of these standards. The thought that there might be such a discrepancy gives
rise to cognitive dissonance or anticipatory guilt feelings (stage 1). This dissonance gives rise
to moral reasoning aimed at resolving the cognitive discrepancy (stage 2). This reasoning can
but need not be biased and self-serving. How likely it is that an agent’s reasoning in support of
a resolution will be biased depends on how conscious she is of her moral standards. This in
turn depends on a number of factors including the strength of her commitment to the moral
standards, i.e., her moral identity. Finally, she will come to a decision in which she does or
does not remain true to her moral standards (stage 3).
4 Conclusion
Moral Disengagement Theory supports a picture of moral reasoning that differs from the
picture that Haidt paints in three respects discussed respectively in sections 3.2-3.4. (1) Moral
reasoning need not be post hoc reasoning aimed at reaffirming prior affect-based judgments. It
18 The moral disengagement mechanisms that Aquino et al. (2005) explore are advantageous comparison, and
moral justification. Detert et al. (2008) investigate minimizing or misconstruing harm to others.
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can also be ante hoc reasoning aimed at resolving apparent inconsistencies brought to light by
guilt feelings. (2) Such reasoning frequently leads to a change in someone’s opinion, which
means that moral reasoning often is effective. (3) Such reasoning can be unbiased, and
sometimes fulfills the role of a disinterested judge.
Given the role that cognitive dissonance turns out to play in moral reasoning, it is not
credible that affect and cognition are independent forces in moral reasoning, as Haidt suggests.
Instead, affect and cognition often contribute to the formation of moral judgments together.
Hence, any plausible theory has to be hybrid and combine features from sentimentalism and
rationalism, as it does in Sentimental Rationalism, the position that I propose and defend in
Hindriks 2014. According to Sentimental Rationalism, both cognition and affect can play a
constructive role in the formation of moral judgments.
Acknowledgments I presented this paper at the workshop on Everyday Reasons held in Rotterdam, November
2013. In addition to the participants of that workshop, I thank Katrien Schaubroeck and two anonymous referees
for very helpful comments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which
permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are
credited.
References
Aquino K, Reed A (2002) The self-importance of moral identity. J Personal Soc Psychol Rev 83:1423–40
Aquino K, Reed A (2003) Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral regard toward Out-groups. J Personal
Soc Psychol Rev 84:1270–86
Aquino K, Reed A, Thau S, Freeman D (2005) A grotesque and dark beauty: How moral identity and
mechanisms of moral disengagement influence cognitive and emotional reactions to War. J Exp Soc
Psychol 43:385–92
Aquino K, Reed A, Freeman D, Lim VKG, Felps W (2009) Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior:
the interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality. J Pers Soc Psychol 97:123–41
Aronson E (1999) Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept. In: Harmon Jones and Mills 103–26
Bandura A (1986) Social foundations of thought and action: a social cognitive theory. Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs
Bandura A (1989) Human agency in social cognitive theory. Am Psychol 44:1175–84
Bandura A (1999) Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personal Soc Psychol
Rev 3:193–209
Bandura A (2001) Social cognitive theory: an agentic perspective. Annu Rev Psychol 52:1–26
Bandura A, Barbaranelli C, Caprara GV, Pastorelli C (1996) Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise
of moral agency. J Pers Soc Psychol 71:364–74
Detert JR, Trevino LK, Sweitzer VL (2008) Moral disengagement in ethical decision making: a study of
antecedents and outcomes. J Appl Psychol 93:374–91
Ditto PH, Pizarro DA, Tannenbaum D (2009) Motivated Moral Reasoning. In: Bartels DM, Baliman CW, Skitka
LJ, Medin DL (eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation 50: 307–38
Evans JSBT (2008) Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annu Rev Psychol
59:255–78
Festinger L (1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press, Stanford
Festinger L, Carlsmith JM (1959) Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. J Abnorm Soc Psychol
58:203–210
Fine C (2006) Is the emotional Dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing It? reason in moral judgment. Philos
Explor 9:83–98
Gini G, Pozzoli T, Hymel S (2014) Moral disengagement among children and youth: a meta-analytic review of
links to aggressive behavior. Aggress Behav 40:56–68
Haidt J (2001) The emotional Dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral Judgment’. Psychol
Rev 108:814–34
Haidt J (2012) The righteous mind: Why good people Are divided by politics and religion. Books, Pantheon
How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment? 249
Haidt J, Björklund F, Murphy S (2000) Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No Reason. Unpublished
manuscript
Harmon-Jones E (2000) An update of cognitive dissonance theory, with a focus on the Self’. In: Tesser A, Felser
R, Suls J (eds) Psychological perspectives on self and identity. American Psychological Association,
Washington, pp 119–44
Johansson P, Hall L, Sikström S, Olsson A (2005) Failure to detect mismatch between intention and outcome in a
simple decision task. Science 310:116–19
Kahneman D (2011) Thinking fast and thinking slow. Allen Lane, London
McAlister AL (2001) Moral disengagement: measurement and modification. J Peace Res 38:87–99
Mercier H, Sperber D (2011) ‘Why Do Humans Reasons? Arguments from an Argumentative Theory’. Behav
Brain Sci 34:57–111
Mills J (1999) Improving the 1957 Version of Dissonance Theory. In: Harmon Jones and Mills 25–42
Monin B, Pizarro DA, Beer DS (2007) Deciding versus reacting: conceptions of moral judgment and the reason-
affect debate. Rev Gen Psychol 11:99–111
Moore C (2008) Moral disengagement in processes of organizational corruption. J Bus Ethics 80:129–39
Moore C, Detert JR, Trevino LK, Baker VL, Mayer DM (2012) Why employees Do Bad things: moral
disengagement and unethical organizational behavior. Pers Psychol 65:1–48
Nickerson RS (1998) Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Rev Gen Psychol 2:175–220
Nisbett RE, Wilson TD (1977) Telling more than We Can know: verbal reports on mental processes. Psychol Rev
84:231–59
Osofsky MJ, Bandura A, Zimbardo PG (2005) The role of moral disengagement in the execution process. Law
Hum Behav 29:371–93
Paxton JM, Ungar L, Greene JD (2010) Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment. Cogn Sci 36:163–77
Pizarro DA, Bloom P (2003) The intelligence of the moral intuitions: comment on haidt (2001). Psychol Rev
110:193–196
Prinz J (2007) The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Rest J, Narvaez D, Thoma SJ, Bebeau MJ (2000) A Neo-kohlbergian approach to morality research. J Moral
Educ 29:381–95
Richardson HS (2013) Moral Reasoning. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/reasoning-moral/. Accessed
9 Mar 2013
Saltzstein HD, Kasachkoff T (2004) Haidt's moral intuitionist theory: a psychological and philosophical critique.
Rev Gen Psychol 8:273–282
Sauer H (2011) Social intuitionism and the psychology of moral reasoning. Philosophy Compass 10:708–21
Sneddon A (2007) A social model of moral dumbfounding: implications for studying moral reasoning and moral
judgment. Philos Psychol 20:731–48
Uhlmann EL, Pizarro DA, Tannenbaum D, Ditto PH (2009) The motivated Use of moral principles. Jud Decision
Making 4:476–91
Wilson TD (2002) Strangers to ourselves: discovering the adaptive unconscious. The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, Cambridge
250 F. Hindriks
